



**DANUBE**  
INSTITUTE

# An explosive flashpoint in US–China relations: Taiwan

*Virág Lőrincz*

December 2021

# An explosive flashpoint in US–China relations: Taiwan

*Virág Lőrincz*

*The long-standing conflict between China and Taiwan takes place with varying degrees of intensity. Taiwan since 1971 is no longer recognised as an independent sovereign state by the UN, and the country is significantly dependent on the United States. Moreover, the latter has strategic interests in Taiwan, in addition to the important economic ties it has with the People’s Republic of China. Taking into consideration that both of the great powers have different interests and goals to be achieved in connection to the island, it can serve as an explosive flashpoint in the US – China relations.*

**The creation of the AUKUS (Australia–UK–US) agreement and the intensification of Chinese military mobilisation, have brought into focus the armament of Asian countries with the People’s Republic of China at the centre. The country, which has the third largest military power in the world, has recently acted ominously by ramping up its military pressure on Taiwan with the possibility of invading the island. However, in the changing environment of the international alliance system, the role of Taiwan has evolved and through the US–Taiwan defence cooperation it can be a source of conflict between the US and China. Although the US provides Taiwan with defensive weapons only, the question of an actual defence in the case of a military attack against the island remains unanswered.**

## Historical overview

To understand Taiwan–China–US relations today and their positions in the international alliance system, some historical turning points must be explained. Since 1949, as the consequence of the Chinese Civil War, there are two governments, both claiming to be the only legitimate representative of China, namely the government of the Republic of China (ROC) ruling the island of Taiwan and the government formed by the Communist Party in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the Chinese mainland. In 1971, the United Nations voted to recognise the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China and consequently more and more governments switched from diplomatic recognition of Taipei to that of Beijing but continued to maintain “unofficial” relations with Taiwan, especially the United States, which provides Taiwan with defensive weapons. Today only a few countries, the ones subsidised by Taiwan, recognise the ROC as the legitimate government of China.<sup>1</sup>

## Conflicting perceptions and aspirations

The recent hostility in China–Taiwan relations and the escalation of the in-between tensions are more comprehensible within a framework, where certain concepts and perceptions are clarified. The conflicting aspirations of the two governments stem from different strategic interests. China views Taiwan as an inseparable part from its territory, as a province of China, which eventually will be “unified” with the mainland by force, if need be; although Taiwan has been *de facto* independent from mainland China since 1949, and its intentions of becoming officially independent are ever more intense under the current democratic leadership of President Tsai Ing-wen.<sup>2</sup>

The president of the historically pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was elected for the first time in 2016 and re-elected in 2020. The election of Tsai Ing-wen ended the more than five-decades-long rule of the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) Party, - during that period they were only out of power between 2000 and 2008. It is not an exaggeration to say that the election of Tsai ended a fragile reconciliation process between Taiwan and China that began in the 1980s that resulted in several trading agreements, high-level talks and even government-level meetings between the leaders of the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party. China suspended

communication with Taiwan when the new government failed to acknowledge the “One China” Principle.<sup>3</sup>

In September 2021, Eric Chu was elected as chairman of the KMT Party, which is by far the most pro-mainland party out of the two major parties in Taiwan. In his speech he pledged to renew talks with China and rebuild cross-strait communication channels.<sup>4</sup> He already met Xi Jinping in 2015, and acknowledged the “One China” Principle, however they had different interpretations of the concept.

The conceptual framework behind the PRC’s approach is provided by the “One China Principle”, which was announced in 1949. According to the touchstone for China’s international relations, “*there is only one China in the world and Taiwan is an inalienable part of it*”<sup>5</sup> – as claimed by Chinese Consul General, Lin Jing. On this basis, China refuses diplomatic relations with countries that recognise the ROC and expects other countries to act similarly. The principle was defined in the white paper<sup>6</sup> of the PRC government released by the Taiwan Affairs Office of China’s State Council in 2000. The ultimate goal of China, which is laid out in the document, is the “reunification” and the incorporation of Taiwan into the PRC applying the “one country, two systems” policy.

According to that policy, Taiwan should accept China exercising sovereignty over the island and its “unification” with the mainland, in exchange for significant autonomy. The policy was successfully implemented in Hong Kong (1997)<sup>7</sup> and although the city had become part of Chinese mainland, its capitalist economic system remained unchanged, and it was given a high degree of political autonomy. Taiwan’s government refused to implement the “one country, two systems” policy and since the 2000s its intension to become officially independent has intensified, just as Chinese assertive actions in the region have. The latter is exemplified by the implementation of the new national security law in Hong Kong (2020)<sup>8</sup>, that gives even more political power to the PRC over this special administrative region.

The “One China Principle” must be distinguished from the concept of the “One China Policy”. While the first is a principle, the second refers to several policies. Countries that follow this policy generally recognise and have formal ties with China, however, maintain their own unique relationship with Taiwan through unofficial diplomacy, economic co-operation, and cultural ties.<sup>9</sup>

## The “One–China” Policy of the United States

The “*The US would protect Taiwan if China attacked*” phrase was articulated in President Joe Biden’s interview with CNN in October 2021.<sup>10</sup> The vow is backed by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), that was adopted by the US in 1979 with the aim of protecting its security and commercial interests in Taiwan. The same year, the US established formal diplomatic relations with Beijing and closed its embassy in Taipei during the presidency of Jimmy Carter. It means that the US does not accept Taiwan as an independent state but as Chinese territory. Despite supporting China’s “one country, two systems” policy, the US is the most important ally of Taiwan by providing it with defensive weaponry. The flexible interpretation of the policy was also expressed by former President Donald Trump’s phone call to Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016, which was the first direct contact between the leaders of the two governments for decades, and which was firmly opposed by China.<sup>11</sup> Although, the Chinese demand sovereignty over Taiwan has not been “recognised” but “acknowledged” by the US, the continuity of Washington–Beijing relations is unchanged due to geopolitical reasons.

The current conflict, which erupted over China’s threatening military and political actions, including sending fighter jets into Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone, has triggered US promises to defend Taiwan with military force if it was attacked by China to the surface. Within the framework of the TRA, the US is committed to ensure that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means and thus it will “*provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character*” and “*maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system of the people of Taiwan.*”<sup>12</sup>

The US’ defensive efforts in the region are also determined by the third US-China Communiqué (1982)<sup>13</sup>, which states that the US does not provide Taiwan with arms sales as a long-term policy. However, according to an attachment, which was previously classified and published in September 2019, the US’ resolution depends on China’s commitment of to the peaceful solution of cross-strait disputes. Therefore, the amount and quality of weaponry provided by the US is determined by the threat posed by the PRC.<sup>14</sup>

The importance of Taiwan for the US stems from its geopolitical location, respect for the rule of law and human rights, functioning democratic system and open economy that, in 2020, made it the ninth largest trading partner of the US.<sup>15</sup> Since accepting the TRA, the adherence of the United States' commitment to Taiwan is significant for maintaining credibility in the East Asian region as a defender of democratic values.

## **Defence of Taiwan**

The military strength of Taiwan is ranked 22<sup>nd</sup> out of 140 countries with a defence budget of USD 13 billion which can hardly be compared with that of China, USD 252 billion. The active military personnel of Taiwan counts 165 000 people while the Chinese People's Liberation Army counts more than 2 million.<sup>16</sup> Despite the ramping up Chinese military pressure, it seems like Taiwanese people got used to similar low-intensity provocations. They have been living under Chinese military and political pressure for over a quarter century.

There are suggestions from military strategists that Taiwan should develop its own defence power, given its geostrategic location, just like Israel did. Despite its population, which is less than a half of Taiwan's, the defence budget of Israel is nearly USD 22 billion per year, compared to Taiwan's USD 13 billion. It is the intention of Tsai Ing-wen's government to increase military spending. They have just unveiled a proposal of a USD 8.7 billion special budget for the next five years to fund the acquisition of missiles, naval ships and other systems. Also, the annual defence spending is set to grow by 4% in 2022, which would result in a more than USD 15 billion defence budget.<sup>17</sup>

## **US presence in Taiwan**

President Joe Biden's statement on the US' commitment to defend Taiwan if China attacked, stems from the long term foreign policy of the US, which is based on a law. However, this policy deliberately pursues "strategic ambiguity" so that it is vague about how it would act in the case of an actual attack against Taiwan. It means that the US has the option to go into war for Taiwan but the law does not contain a security guarantee. It also provides the US the opportunity to sell arms to Taiwan. For altering the cooperation with Taiwan, the approval of the Congress is needed, however providing support for the island is one of the rare issues that has bipartisan backing in

the Senate. US Republican lawmakers recently advanced a bill, which would provide USD 2 billion per year to finance Taipei’s defence so that it can resist Chinese pressure.<sup>18</sup>

The recent US administrations have deepened their ties with Taiwan, including significant arms sales, Donald Trump’s direct telephone call to the Taiwanese President and Joe Biden’s invitation of Taiwanese officials to the presidential inauguration. The US arms sales to Taiwan have been significantly increasing in the last few years.

### U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan by Recent Administrations




Figure 1: U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan by Recent Administrations. Source: <https://www.cfr.org/background/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy> (2021. 11. 09.)

The recent arms sales of the Biden administration include howitzers and high-tech munition kits worth of USD 750 million. Although, the US arms sales to Taiwan are not significant in comparison to the Chinese military capabilities, they add to the American presence in the region, causing serious concerns for China.<sup>19</sup>

## **Increasing pressure on Taiwan**

In the beginning of October 2021 (on the National Day of China), Taipei's defence ministry reported at least 56 intrusions into its Air Defence Identification Zone including fighter jets, bombers, and surveillance aircrafts, by the end of the month this number was more than 110.<sup>20</sup> Over the past two years (especially since the re-election of President Tsai Ing-wen in 2020), China has been increasing not just the military pressure on Taiwan, with military exercises and overflights, but also the economic and political pressure. Although the US urged Beijing to cease the provocative activity, China's increasing pressure on Taiwan has caused international concern. Besides the tensions provoked by conventional military forces, actors connected to China conduct long-term "grey zone" activities against Taiwan, including informational warfare, disinformation campaigns, and cyber-attacks.

Regarding the future of Taiwan, the US is committed not to change its "One China" Policy approach, non the less Secretary of State Antony Blinken called for supporting Taiwan to become member of United Nations agencies. Considering the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, it is not up for political debate that Taipei's participation in, - among others -, the World Health Organization (WHO) would be essential. The diplomatic pressure from the PRC government intensified after the election of Taiwan's pro-independence President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016, including the exclusion of the ROC from the WHO meetings as an observer.<sup>21</sup>

The peaceful arrangement of Taipei–Beijing opposition is in China's interest not only because of the possible intervention of the US but also because of the close economic relations between the island and the Chinese mainland, as Taiwan is a global microchip supplier. The possibility of a Chinese military attack against Taiwan to "reunify" the country is not excluded, though the Chinese president responsible for it would be accountable for Chinese people fighting Chinese people, and the aftermath of a military attack would result in taking control of a territory where most of the population is against the PRC government. Based on a 2021 survey conducted among the Taiwanese population, over 25% would support independence and over 27%



would maintain the status quo indefinitely, and approximately 7% would choose the unification with the mainland sooner or later.<sup>22</sup>




Figure 1: Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland (2021/06)

### Probability of a military invasion

An actual military invasion would cause regional instability affecting not just the US, but also Australia, Japan, and other states. According to experts, a direct conflict now is unlikely, but there is no doubt that Taiwan will remain a flashpoint in US–China relations in the future and its status will be determined by the balance of forces. It was in 1996 when the two sides came the closest to a military conflict, when as a response to Chinese military exercises 20 miles from the coasts of Taiwan, the US sent two aircraft carrier groups to the region. Since it had no aircraft back then, China withdrew. Since that incident, China has developed massive military capabilities, and today’s latest reports are about nuclear-capable hypersonic missiles, even if China denies having them. The new weapon would allow Beijing to attack the US from an unexpected direction. Although Chinese officials stated it was only an experimental spacecraft, there is no doubt that Beijing has been investing lately in short-range

hypersonic missiles. Either way, it drives the two states into an arms race: the US has already tested its own advanced hypersonic design in September.<sup>23</sup> According to Chiu Kuo-cheng, defence minister of Taiwan, China could be capable of a “full-scale” invasion of the island by 2025.<sup>24</sup> By that time, the Chinese anti-intervention and blockade system across the Taiwan Strait would operate.

Regarding Chinese strategic planning, President Xi Jinping emphasises that “reunification” of Taiwan with the mainland is essential to achieve the so-called Chinese Dream, which refers to the country’s great-power status by 2049. It is the ground for that many experts are forecasting a Chinese military action against Taiwan not in the near future but within the next decades.<sup>25</sup> According to the Anti-Secession Law, accepted by Beijing in 2005, the PRC government could justify the use of non-peaceful means under the condition that Taiwan attempts secession from China, or if the peaceful unification is not feasible in the long term.<sup>26</sup> The significance of the occupation of Taiwan is not that it would pose a security threat to China, but it would be the symbol of the strength of the Chinese Communist Party.

*“China is unlikely to try to militarily seize Taiwan in the next couple of years”* – said General Mark Milley, top US general and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>27</sup> Although non-military actions, hybrid threats or limited aggression can be expected, including cyber-attacks, blockades or seizing offshore islands. The increasing Chinese military pressure on Taiwan can be considered as a counter-action to the US’ “shift to the Pacific” after its withdrawal from Afghanistan. Indeed, the creation of the AUKUS agreement, the increasing Western presence in the region, specifically joint exercises of the US and Japan on the South China Sea, and the sending of French and German warships to the area all aim at countering the Chinese activity in the Indo-Pacific.<sup>28</sup>

It is very much in the interest of the US, in the aftermath of the Afghanistan events, to support Taiwan, as a symbol of democracy, showing that Washington stands up for its allies. By ramping up military pressure, China is testing the US’ commitment to defend Taiwan. The statement of the Taiwanese President about confirming for the first time that US troops are stationing on the island<sup>29</sup> can be considered as a response to the increasing military threat, although the American soldiers’ presence carries a political significance rather than a military one. By supporting Taiwan, the US sinks into a

situation that in case the Chinese use force against Taiwan, there is the probability that the US will be drawn into a large war with the risk of (un)intentional nuclear escalation.

From a broader perspective, the attitudes of the neighbouring countries should also concern China. As for Australia, the interpretation of the “One China” Policy is similar to that of the US, meaning that it has “acknowledged” but not “recognised” Beijing’s claim over Taiwan. In October 2021, Australian Defence Minister Peter Dutton said that Australia would support the US in case of a Chinese attack against Taiwan.<sup>30</sup> Similar conduct could be expected from Japan, since the newly elected President Kishida Fumio was reassured of US defence support. Also, an announcement was made on increasing defence expenditures to 2% from 1% of the Japanese GDP. The motivation behind Japanese defence build-up is its dispute with China regarding the South-China Sea, and the potential invasion of Taiwan, which would mean an existential threat to Japan.<sup>31</sup>

## Conclusions

In spite of being a long-standing conflict, the China–Taiwan opposition has not yet come to an armed conflict since the 1960s. Although it can be explained by the fact that the Chinese military capabilities have never been as strong as they are now, and in reality, it is neither countries’ intention to create a war zone. The US’ response regarding its troops stationing on the island, makes the country’s intentions clear. The American support merely makes China rethink the possibility of a military invasion, rather than encouraging it to prepare for a war. However, no doubt that improving the military capabilities and growing the number of incursions increase the risk of an accident or miscalculation, which can eventually lead to an armed conflict.

Regarding the new AUKUS agreement, it was strongly welcomed by Taiwan as evidence of the US’ commitment to support its allies, to deterrence, and to stand up to Chinese assertiveness. The future acquisitions of Australia, including nuclear-powered submarines, will allow the Australian navy to be present on the waters surrounding Taiwan if needed. However, taking into consideration that the nuclear capabilities of Australia are going to be available only from the late 2030s, Taiwan would benefit more from direct security commitments than opaque partnerships such as AUKUS.

## Bibliography

- 2021 Taiwan Military Strength. [https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country\\_id=taiwan](https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=taiwan) (2021. 11. 10.)
- Anti-Secession Law (Full text) (03/15/05):  
<https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceus//eng/zt/999999999/t187406.htm> (2021. 11. 02.)
- BRUMFIEL, Geoff: Behind murky claim of a new hypersonic missile test, there lies a very real arms race. <https://www.npr.org/2021/10/20/1047384050/behind-murky-claim-of-a-new-hypersonic-missile-test-there-lies-a-very-real-arms-?t=1636306573348> (2021. 11. 07.)
- CHEUNG, Eric: China could be ready to mount a 'full-scale' invasion of Taiwan by 2025, island's defense minister says. <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/06/asia/taiwan-defense-minister-china-attack-intl-hnk/index.html> (2021. 11. 07.)
- China unlikely to try to militarily seize Taiwan in near future, top U.S. general. <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-unlikely-try-militarily-seize-taiwan-near-future-top-us-general-2021-11-03/> (2021. 11. 07.)
- DAVIDSON, Helen: Taiwan reports record Chinese incursions into its air defence zone. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/04/taiwan-reports-record-chinese-incursions-into-its-air-defence-zone> (2021. 11. 07.)
- DAVIDSON, Helen: Why is China increasing its military pressure on Taiwan? <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/06/why-is-china-increasing-its-military-pressure-on-taiwan> (2021. 11. 07.)
- DRUN, Jessica: One China, Multiple Interpretations. In: Center for Advanced China Research, December 2017.  
<https://web.archive.org/web/20200309224301/https://www.ccpwatch.org/single-post/2017/12/29/One-China-Multiple-Interpretations> (2021. 11. 06.)
- Election Study Center, National Chengchi University: Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland (1994/12 – 2021/06).  
<https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963> (2021. 11. 06.)
- GREEN, Michael J.: What is the U.S. "One China" Policy, and why does it matter? In: Center for Strategic & International Studies, January 2017.  
<https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-us-one-china-policy-and-why-does-it-matter> (2021. 11. 06.)

Hong Kong reunification ordinance. <https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr97-98/english/bills/a110-e.htm> (2021. 11. 03.)

Japan's Coming Defense Buildup. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/japans-coming-defense-buildup-fumio-kishida-liberal-democratic-party-tokyo-china-11634239294> (2021. 11. 08)

LIPTAK, Kevin: Biden vows to protect Taiwan in event of Chinese attack. <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/21/politics/taiwan-china-biden-town-hall/index.html> (2021. 11. 06.)

MAIZLAND, Lindsay: Why China-Taiwan relations are so tense. In: Council on Foreign Relations, May, 2021. <https://www.cfr.org/backgroundunder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy> (2021. 11. 02.)

MAIZLAND, Lindsay: Why China-Taiwan relations are so tense. In: Council on Foreign Relations, May, 2021. <https://www.cfr.org/backgroundunder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy> (2021. 11. 02.)

One China Principle is non-negotiable – by Consul General Lin Jing. [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/wjb\\_663304/zwjg\\_665342/zwbd\\_665378/t1825375.shtml](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1825375.shtml) (2021. 11. 03.)

PHILIPS, Tom – SMITH, Nicola – WOOLF, Nicky: Trump's phone call with Taiwan president risks China's wrath. <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/03/trump-angers-beijing-with-provocative-phone-call-to-taiwan-president> (2021. 11. 06.)

QUINN, Jimmy: Blinken wants to end Taiwan's U.N. exclusion. In: National Review, October 2021. <https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/blinken-wants-to-end-taiwans-u-n-exclusion/> (2021. 11. 06.)

RIPLEY, Will – CHEUNG, Eric – WESTCOTT, Ben: Taiwan's President says the threat from China is increasing 'every day' and confirms presence of US military trainers on the island. <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/27/asia/tsai-ingwen-taiwan-china-interview-intl-hnk/index.html> (2021. 11. 08.)

Taiwan opposition party's new leader pledges renewed talks with China. <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-opposition-partys-new-leader-pledges-renewed-talks-with-china-2021-09-25/> (2021. 12. 07.)

Taiwan Relations Act. <https://www.ait.org.tw/our-relationship/policy-history/key-u-s-foreign-policy-documents-region/taiwan-relations-act/> (2021. 11. 06.)

The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

<https://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/pdf/20202448e/egn2020244872.pdf> (2021. 11. 03.)

THRALL, Trevor A. – COHEN, Jordan B. – KLARE, Michael: New arms sales send the wrong signal on Taiwan.

<https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/08/17/new-arms-sales-send-the-wrong-signal-on-taiwan/> (2021. 11. 08.)

Timeline: Taiwan – China relations since 1949.

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/1/3/timeline-taiwan-china-relations-since-1949> (2021. 12. 07.)

Trade in Goods with Taiwan. In: Foreign Trade January, 2020.

<https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5830.html> (2021. 11. 06.)

U.S. Republicans want billions for Taiwan military aid to counter China.

<https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-republicans-want-billions-taiwan-military-aid-counter-china-2021-11-04/> (2021. 11. 07.)

United States – China Joint Communique on United States Arms Sales to Taiwan.

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/united-states-china-joint-communique-united-states-arms-sales-taiwan> (2021. 11. 06.)

WANG, Joyu: Taiwan Plans to Bulk Up Military Budget to Contend With Chinese Pressure. [https://www.wsj.com/articles/taiwan-plans-to-bulk-up-military-budget-to-contend-with-chinese-pressure-11631787522?mod=article\\_inline](https://www.wsj.com/articles/taiwan-plans-to-bulk-up-military-budget-to-contend-with-chinese-pressure-11631787522?mod=article_inline) (2021. 11. 10.)

War with China is a 'question for the Chinese': Peter Dutton.

<https://www.skynews.com.au/australia-news/defence-and-foreign-affairs/war-with-china-is-a-question-for-the-chinese-peter-dutton/video/4e910b59a73d5813b1f5951e0a655af3> (2021. 11. 08.)

White Paper: The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue: The Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office of the State Council, 21 February, 2000.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20200220120215/http://en.people.cn/features/taiwanpaper/taiwan.html> (2021. 11. 03.)

YEUNG, Jessie: China celebrates 50 years of being in the UN – and it’s determined to keep Taiwan out. <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/25/china/taiwan-un-anniversary-mic-intl-hnk/index.html> (2021. 10. 27.)

## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> YEUNG, Jessie: China celebrates 50 years of being in the UN – and it's determined to keep Taiwan out. <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/25/china/taiwan-un-anniversary-mic-intl-hnk/index.html> (2021. 10. 27.)
- <sup>2</sup> MAIZLAND, Lindsay: Why China-Taiwan relations are so tense. In: Council on Foreign Relations, May, 2021. Source: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy> (2021. 11. 02.)
- <sup>3</sup> Timeline: Taiwan – China relations since 1949. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/1/3/timeline-taiwan-china-relations-since-1949> (2021. 12. 07.)
- <sup>4</sup> Taiwan opposition party's new leader pledges renewed talks with China. <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-opposition-partys-new-leader-pledges-renewed-talks-with-china-2021-09-25/> (2021. 12. 07.)
- <sup>5</sup> One China Principle is non-negotiable – by Consul General Lin Jing. [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/wjb\\_665304/zwjg\\_665342/zwbdb\\_665378/t1825375.shtml](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_665304/zwjg_665342/zwbdb_665378/t1825375.shtml) (2021. 11. 03.)
- <sup>6</sup> White Paper: The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue: The Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office of the State Council, 21 February, 2000. <https://web.archive.org/web/20200220120215/http://en.people.cn/features/taiwanpaper/taiwan.html> (2021. 11. 03.)
- <sup>7</sup> Hong Kong reunification ordinance. <https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr97-98/english/bills/a110-e.htm> (2021. 11. 03.)
- <sup>8</sup> The Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. <https://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/pdf/20202448e/egn2020244872.pdf> (2021. 11. 03.)
- <sup>9</sup> DRUN, Jessica: One China, Multiple Interpretations. In: Center for Advanced China Research, December 2017. <https://web.archive.org/web/20200309224301/https://www.ccpwatch.org/single-post/2017/12/29/One-China-Multiple-Interpretations> (2021. 11. 06.)
- <sup>10</sup> LIPTAK, Kevin: Biden vows to protect Taiwan in event of Chinese attack. <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/21/politics/taiwan-china-biden-town-hall/index.html> (2021. 11. 06.)
- <sup>11</sup> PHILIPS, Tom – SMITH, Nicola – WOOLF, Nicky: Trump's phone call with Taiwan president risks China's wrath. <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/03/trump-angers-beijing-with-provocative-phone-call-to-taiwan-president> (2021. 11. 06.)
- <sup>12</sup> Taiwan Relations Act. <https://www.ait.org.tw/our-relationship/policy-history/key-u-s-foreign-policy-documents-region/taiwan-relations-act/> (2021. 11. 06.)
- <sup>13</sup> United States – China Joint Communique on United States Arms Sales to Taiwan. <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/united-states-china-joint-communique-united-states-arms-sales-taiwan> (2021. 11. 06.)
- <sup>14</sup> GREEN, Michael J.: What is the U.S. "One China" Policy, and why does it matter? In: Center for Strategic & International Studies, January 2017. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-us-one-china-policy-and-why-does-it-matter> (2021. 11. 06.)
- <sup>15</sup> Trade in Goods with Taiwan. In: Foreign Trade January, 2020. <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5830.html> (2021. 11. 06.)
- <sup>16</sup> 2021 Taiwan Military Strength. [https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country\\_id=taiwan](https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=taiwan) (2021. 11. 10.)
- <sup>17</sup> WANG, Joyu: Taiwan Plans to Bulk Up Military Budget to Contend With Chinese Pressure. [https://www.wsj.com/articles/taiwan-plans-to-bulk-up-military-budget-to-contend-with-chinese-pressure-11631787522?mod=article\\_inline](https://www.wsj.com/articles/taiwan-plans-to-bulk-up-military-budget-to-contend-with-chinese-pressure-11631787522?mod=article_inline) (2021. 11. 10.)
- <sup>18</sup> U.S. Republicans want billions for Taiwan military aid to counter China. <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-republicans-want-billions-taiwan-military-aid-counter-china-2021-11-04/> (2021. 11. 07.)
- <sup>19</sup> THRALL, Trevor A. – COHEN, Jordan B. – KLARE, Michael: New arms sales send the wrong signal on Taiwan. <https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/08/17/new-arms-sales-send-the-wrong-signal-on-taiwan/> (2021. 11. 08.)
- <sup>20</sup> DAVIDSON, Helen: Taiwan reports record Chinese incursions into its air defence zone. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/04/taiwan-reports-record-chinese-incursions-into-its-air-defence-zone> (2021. 11. 07.)
- <sup>21</sup> QUINN, Jimmy: Blinken wants to end Taiwan's U.N. exclusion. In: National Review, October 2021. <https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/blinken-wants-to-end-taiwans-u-n-exclusion/> (2021. 11. 06.)
- <sup>22</sup> Election Study Center, National Chengchi University: Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland (1994/12 – 2021/06). <https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963> (2021. 11. 06.)

---

<sup>23</sup> BRUMFIEL, Geoff: Behind murky claim of a new hypersonic missile test, there lies a very real arms race. <https://www.npr.org/2021/10/20/1047384050/behind-murky-claim-of-a-new-hypersonic-missile-test-there-lies-a-very-real-arms-?t=1636306573348> (2021. 11. 07.)

<sup>24</sup> CHEUNG, Eric: China could be ready to mount a 'full-scale' invasion of Taiwan by 2025, island's defense minister says. <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/06/asia/taiwan-defense-minister-china-attack-intl-hnk/index.html> (2021. 11. 07.)

<sup>25</sup> MAIZLAND, Lindsay: Why China-Taiwan relations are so tense. In: Council on Foreign Relations, May, 2021. <https://www.cfr.org/background/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy> (2021. 11. 02.)

<sup>26</sup> Anti-Secession Law (Full text)(03/15/05). <https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceus//eng/zt/999999999/t187406.htm> (2021. 11. 02.)

<sup>27</sup> China unlikely to try to militarily seize Taiwan in near future, top U.S. general. <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-unlikely-try-militarily-seize-taiwan-near-future-top-us-general-2021-11-03/> (2021. 11. 07.)

<sup>28</sup> DAVIDSON, Helen: Why is China increasing its military pressure on Taiwan? <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/06/why-is-china-increasing-its-military-pressure-on-taiwan> (2021. 11. 07.)

<sup>29</sup> RIPLEY, Will – CHEUNG, Eric – WESTCOTT, Ben: Taiwan's President says the threat from China is increasing 'every day' and confirms presence of US military trainers on the island. <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/27/asia/tsai-ingwen-taiwan-china-interview-intl-hnk/index.html> (2021. 11. 08.)

<sup>30</sup> War with China is a 'question for the Chinese': Peter Dutton. <https://www.skynews.com.au/australia-news/defence-and-foreign-affairs/war-with-china-is-a-question-for-the-chinese-peter-dutton/video/4e910b59a73d5813b1f5951e0a655af3> (2021. 11. 08.)

<sup>31</sup> Japan's Coming Defense Buildup. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/japans-coming-defense-buildup-fumio-kishida-liberal-democratic-party-tokyo-china-11634239294> (2021. 11. 08.)