




DANUIDE PAPERS DANUDEL

HISTORICAL ROOTS OF HUNGARIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IV – THE HORTHY REGIME

ÁDÁM DARABOS



Historical roots of Hungarian Christian Democracy IV – The Horthy regime

Ádám Darabos

January 2023

Historical roots of Hungarian Christian Democracy IV – The Horthy regime

Ádám Darabos

In our last articles, we investigated the [early historical roots of Hungarian Christian democracy](#) and the appearance of the first Hungarian Christian party, the [Catholic People's Party](#). We also elaborated on the turbulences of the ["happy times of peace" and the collapse](#). As the four articles in this series, this paper investigates the historical roots of Hungarian Christian democracy in the Horthy regime from 1920 to 1944. It should be underlined that due to the length of the period and the complicated relations of political Christianity, only three aspects will be presented.

First, in the introduction, the stabilisation of Bethlen's government will be outlined to place Christian party politics in context. Then, the essence of the regime's ideology, namely Christian nationalism, will be briefly analysed. In the end, the sprouts of Christian democratic initiatives will be presented. Hungary's history of Christian politics and the history of Christian ideas would deserve a longer article. Still, the leading ambition is capturing the roots of Hungarian Christian democracy.

Keywords: *Christian democracy, Christian socialism, Hungarian politics, Christian politics, Horthy regime*

Introduction

At the end of our previous examination, it was highlighted that even though the newly founded Christian political party, the Christian National Union Party, won the election in 1920 and its leaders (Pál Teleki, Kunó Klebelsberg, Ottokár Prohászka) were among the most influential public figures of the Horthy regime, the decisive force of the consolidation was István Bethlen and his Unity Party. Bethlen was the Prime Minister from 1921 to 1931, but his influence eventually remained until the end of the 1930s. With the marginalisation of Christian Democratic politicians, the Christian renewal or the “renaissance” of the Horthy regime lacked a genuine democratic spirit. Hungary has never been lacking in nationalism, but the brutal consequences of the Great War, the Treaty of Trianon, its antecedents (e.g., the Roman invasion of Eastern Hungary and Republic of Councils in Hungary), and effects (e.g., losing most of the territory and population, surrounded by hostile nations with an inadequate army, narrow possibilities in foreign policy, social decay, revisionist ambitions) led to its radical strengthening. In the 1920s, Bethlen’s consolidation managed to navigate the nation out of the crisis. Still, the effects of the Great Depression and the onset of the Second World War necessitated more comprehensive reforms in the 1930s. Thus, the tendencies of the 1920s and 1930s are quite separate from each other. The question is whether Christianity, especially Catholicism as the dominant religion in Hungary (2/3 of the Christians were Roman Catholic), could influence political developments in either decade.

The Roman Catholic Church already felt the infringement of its interest by the “liberal” Church policies of the 1890s and the emancipation of the Jews.¹ That was one of the reasons why political Catholicism occurred in Hungary in the form of the People’s Party in 1895. The Christian socialist initiatives of the beginning of the century, especially by Sándor Giesswein (1856-1923), professed the extension of democratic rights. Ottokár Prohászka (1858-1927) was even more influential with his active social Christianity, but historical events determined his perspective on democracy.² None of them received general and persistent support from the upper clergy.

Nevertheless, the general opposition between the Church and socialism resulted in a complete antagonism as a result of the Republic of Councils (also called the Hungarian Soviet Republic) in Hungary (from 21 March 1919 to 1 August 1919). One of the first targets of the communist regime was Christians and Christian institutions. Amongst other things, it led to the confiscation of property and political persecution. The Office for the Liquidation of Religious Affairs in the Kun government “attempted either to expropriate the churches, or to eliminate them, or to at least make their situation untenable. The complete aping of Russian Soviet policy degenerated into a hostile anticlericalism.”³ Therefore, a natural reaction occurred: anything from the left is evil. Even raising the possibility of cooperation with socialists could easily result in being branded as a traitor to the nation.

Due to the high ratio of the Jewish population in the liberal and socialist intelligentsia, and especially the leaders of the Republic of Councils (higher than their ratio in the entire population), the general Christian anti-Judaism also strengthened. Liberalism was closely associated with the Jewish community since they were treated as the proponents and beneficiaries of liberal capitalism. Furthermore, both liberalism and socialism, as well as Jewish people, were treated as foreign elements in the body of the nation. Thus, despite their vast merits, even the most significant figures of the Catholic Church, including bishop Ottokár Prohászka (1858-1927) and “press apostle” Béla Bangha (1880-1940), professed antisemitic views. The receptiveness of new-conservative and agrarian circles to antisemitic rhetoric was also significant.⁴ The fact that both Prohászka and Bangha formulated reservations against the new Catholic “course” in the Horthy regime does not result in the fact that they did not contribute to the new ideology of the system, namely Christian nationalism.

Christian nationalism

The Horthy regime can be framed in several ways by its fundamental ideological features. It could be called Christian, conservative, Christian-conservative, nationalist, or revisionist. Nevertheless, in a discussion about the historical roots of Christian democracy, the most common interpretative framework which determined the relationship between the Church and the State and the whole

political climate for Christian politics is Christian nationalism.⁵ Hints were given on the nature of nationalism and Christianity above. Still, it should be emphasized, as Fazekas does, that the political elite used 'Christianity' primarily to define what is not Christian (leftists, liberals, atheists, communists, Jewish etc.), rather than determine what Christian is. Although there were differences between Christians, the former very short communist era was so anti-clerical, anti-Christian and anti-religious that the Church inexorably turned towards nationalism in the Horthy era.⁶ Even if it was not democratic (which was not a significant problem then), it was at least not communist or liberal. Even those not suspected of antisemitism, such as Giesswein, who fought against antisemitism, or Antal Schütz (1880-1953), resisted both liberalism and communism.⁷

The regent of the Hungarian Kingdom was Miklós Horthy from 1920 to 1944, but the leader of political life, especially in the first half of the regime, was István Bethlen. Though Bethlen was a former Christian National Union Party member and was a prime minister first from April 1921 to February 1922 based mainly on the coalition between this party and the smallholders (National Smallholders and Agrarian Workers Party), his ambition was not to create a robust Christian socialist or democratic party but to formulate a dominant governing party that could serve as a leading force in the consolidation.⁸ Many Christian politicians' reputation suffered (and lost Horthy's trust) because they were royalists ("legitimists") and supported Charles IV's two (unsuccessful) attempts to reclaim the Hungarian throne. Bethlen was hostile with them; thus, in terms of political support, he began to rely more on smallholders than Christians.

Bethlen had Horthy's trust, and his new catch-all party, the Unity Party, with a landslide victory, gained 57,38% of the mandates in the 1922 elections. The second was the Hungarian Social Democratic Party, with 10,25%, which could run in the elections due to the Bethlen-Peyer Pact. Based on it, social democrats could legally work, but their activities, such as propaganda and organising strikes in worker's circles, were limited. There was no question about who would rule for years (with two reforms of the party between 1922 and 1944); Bethlen's dominance in the National Assembly was unequivocal. Concerning the fragmentation of

parliamentary life, it is also telling that the representatives of fifteen (!) parties were MEPs from 1922 to 1926. How did the Christian parties perform?

After gaining the most support in 1920, the Christian National Union Party collapsed. Already in 1920, the group led by István Friedrich quit and founded the Christian National Party. The result of the fragmentation was clearly visible in the 1922 elections; the party fell to 4,10% of the vote (the other parties, such as the Christian Socialist Party and Christian National Party, performed even worse). Furthermore, after the elections, István Haller's wing joined the opposition. At the same time, Károly Huszár and Sándor Ernst, formed a new party, the Christian National Unity Party (only the Union changed to Unity), supported the government as a coalition partner until its dissolution in 1926 when the two groups united – together with others – in the Christian Economic and Social Party. In Fazekas's words, this party "remained the hub of Christian Party politics until 1937."⁹ Although the party achieved second place in the 1926 election with 14,29% of the mandates, its opportunities did not increase; Bethlen's Unity party gained 69,38% of the mandates. Thus, Bethlen's dominance was cemented, and the Christian party joined the government.

In short, Bethlen astutely expanded his power in the first years of the 1920s (his greatest opponent in Union Party, the smallholder leader István Nagyatádi Szabó, was also suspected of corruption and resigned), and Christian socialists – just like other political parties – simply became the subjects and not significant actors of high politics. This lasted until the very end of the Horthy era. Numerous new Christian parties were formed, but none could significantly affect the general outcome. Ultimately, Christian socialism and democracy became peripheral in this era. As Fazekas concludes, even within the unified Christian Party, "the social conscience and democratic program disappeared. At the same time, anti-Semitism and conservative opposition to capitalism and liberalism gained ground."¹⁰

This does not necessarily mean that political Catholicism did not flourish. Through his long consolidation, which brought the national-conservative revival, Bethlen heavily relied on Christian Churches, especially the Roman Catholic

Church and its leaders, including the Archbishop of Esztergom and Primate of Hungary, János Csernoch. The government and the Church cooperated on several issues. The former “hoped to restore its authority which had been shaken by the earlier reform of Church-State relations during the liberal era,” while the latter benefited from the moral authority, social organisation and activities of the Church, as Fazekas points out; the researcher concludes that “[t]he ideology of Christian nationalism was nothing less than the complete identification of the interests of the Hungarian state, or rather its leading institutions and organisations, and those of the historical churches.”¹¹ The Church received its estates and assumed a fundamental role in education, for which it received significant support from the state. In 1926, the House of Magnates was reintroduced, further favouring the high dignitaries of the Church who took part in it. The cooperation was apparent in the government as well; three of the eleven government members were from Christian National Unity Party from 1922 to 1926

The Protestant Churches were not insignificant either (Horthy was a Calvinist), but they accepted the Christian-national ideology and the dominance of the Catholic Church in it, writes Gábor Erdődy. Though Christian politics was integrated, it did not take any form of ecumenism, as it was based on the general features of Hungarian Catholicism. Furthermore, Christian politics was limited to those within the Christian-national ideological camp.¹² Analogously, Szabó concludes that the high priesthood felt responsible for representing Christian and Church values in political life. In turn, the government also treated them as its only Christian partner.¹³ It meant that beyond these confines, no practical Christian politicking was available.

In this context of political hegemony it should also be mentioned that even though particular (Christian) political figures supported democracy, electoral forms were subordinated to the retention of political power. Beyond the fact that Christian socialism was limited as it conflicted with the interest of the high estates, the electoral system was designed so that it was impossible to replace the government. Voting conditions were altered, and open voting replaced the ballot box in rural areas. Furthermore, intimidation was common and “corrupt electoral tactics and use of the police against the opposition” was widespread.¹⁴ Even if

some politicians in Bethlen's system called themselves Christian democrats (e.g., János Láng), and Bethlen explicitly endorsed "Christian democracy,"¹⁵ it was not similar to either Christian democratic ideas of the era or the practice of democratic political parties after the Second World War. They professed limited democracy and distanced themselves from liberal Catholicism and democracy. Instead, they represented the interest of the conservative aristocracy.¹⁶

According to Giesswein and Barankovics, the new system had nothing to do with Christianity, recalls Gergely. Both rejected pseudo-Christian politics, which degraded Christianity, and remained out of the Christian "concentration." Prohászka denoted it as "Christianity without Christians."¹⁷ Giesswein – who argued that the Christian party is not necessarily conservative as it is not tied to any form of government, social or political system – did not have the opportunity to continue building his new party (Reform party) due to his death in 1923.¹⁸

Christian democratic sprouts

The 1930s brought a new economic, social, political and cultural climate primarily due to the effects of the Great Depression. Social tensions and frictions fortified, as did German influence on Hungarian politics. Thus, new elements, such as the call for social reforms, rising antisemitism, and an upsurge of fascist tendencies, occurred. Still, the general outline of Christian nationalism did not change, and the failure of Christian politics in Hungary remained.¹⁹ Although Christian democratic politics was not an option, three aspects of its development: namely new Christian concepts; new Christian movements; and several Christian intellectuals, should be discussed. Obviously, these are related in that the new ideas were usually promulgated by Christian intellectuals who were significant in leading new Christian movements. Nevertheless, they will be separated for structural reasons. Even if the investigation will be short, it is necessary to mention these aspects since they will serve as a basis for Christian democratic politics after the Second World War.

*New Christian concepts – solidarism, subsidiarity, and corporatism*²⁰

Parallel to the new decade and the Great Depression was the encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* issued by Pope Pius XI in 1931. Just like *Rerum Novarum* established the grounds of Christian social thought, *Quadragesimo Anno* brought a new impulse to the Christian movements throughout Europe, including Hungary. Furthermore, three new concepts affected the shape of Christian social developments.

Solidarism, mainly based on Heinrich Pesch's ideas, maintained that private property and market economy should be balanced by state regulations based on the concept of social justice, making a "third way" between ("or rather beyond" as Invernizzi Accetti adds) capitalism and socialism.²¹ Subsidiarity, which later became one of the principles of the European Community and originated from earlier times, was closely related to the function of the state. Pope Pius XI wrote:

"Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the community, so also it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do. For every social activity ought of its very nature to furnish help to the members of the body social, and never destroy and absorb them. The supreme authority of the State ought, therefore, to let subordinate groups handle matters and concerns of lesser importance, which would otherwise dissipate its efforts greatly. Thereby the State will more freely, powerfully, and effectively do all those things that belong to it alone because it alone can do them: directing, watching, urging, restraining, as occasion requires and necessity demands."²²

Beyond the fact that it is clear that the Catholic Church considered a limited role for the state, this idea puts a more profound emphasis on the public responsibilities of individuals and small communities. Therefore, it is not only a proper instrument against statism and totalitarian states), but it also directly leads to the prominence of Christian associations.

The third concept, which became influential in the 1930s, also in Hungary, due to the *Quadragesimo Anno*, was corporatism. Based initially on François-René La Tour

du Pin's doctrine (1834-1924), the society was structured into individuals, corporations, and the state. The early social reformer's idea was a rejuvenation of the medieval structure in which every level had its rights, and those rights existed in a well-built order (e.g., individuals' voluntary right to join corporations, corporations establishing their order but taking into account the individuals' and the state's right, and the state to respect those rights but to harmonise between the corporations). Therefore, they limited each other but provided space for social bargaining (as corporations were also to be formed based on professions, thus between employers and employees) and social action.

Unfortunately, authoritarian tendencies prevail if the sensitive balance between the units is disturbed, especially by the state using its authority above individuals and corporations. It was a further problem that the concept of Christian corporatism was explicitly appropriated by several authoritarian regimes during the interwar years, as Invernizzi Accetti concludes.²³ As the two developments (growing authoritarian tendencies and the spread of corporatism) were parallel in time, and their adherents occasionally overlapped, the structure's similarities often outweighed the differences, which cast a bad light on the concept of Christian corporatism.

Christian mass movements

The new impulse brought by *Quadragesimo Anno* fell on fertile grounds in the Horthy era due to the high number of Christians and the close cooperation of the political system and the Churches. In the 1930s, Catholic mass movements were formed mainly based on vocational orders. The Jesuit predominance was prevalent in the leading social organisations. Probably the most significant association was the National Alliance of Catholic Youth and Agricultural Organizations (Katolikus Agrárifjúsági Legényegyletek Országos Szövetsége, KALOT) led by the Jesuit Jenő Kerkai (1904-1970). KALOT was founded in 1935 independently from political parties. Its role was to gather and organise agricultural workers and farmers' associations to reinforce the agrarian society's material, spiritual and moral development. Obviously, as Gergely highlights, it could not fight for democratic land reform, which was one of its prime interests,

as the high priesthood opposed it. Nevertheless, KALOT had its local associations almost down to the village level and – through years of hard work – produced a self-aware popular base.²⁴

The names of the umbrella organisations adequately summarised the purpose and base of the associations, for instance, the Alliance of Catholic Girl's Circles (Katolikus Leánykörök Szövetsége, KALÁSZ), the National Alliance of Catholic Working Girls and Women (Katolikus Dolgozó Leányok és Nők Országos Szövetsége, DLN), the Professional Organization (Hivatásszervezet) and the Parish Workers' Division (Egyházközségi Munkásszakosztályok, EMSZO) were established. Altogether, these associations were significant actors advancing social Christianity and public Catholicism. They mobilised masses of people and had a huge social influence.²⁵ Even though – as Gergely points out – genuine Christian democrats treated these movements with serious reservations (as, in their opinion, they lacked democratic spirit), which resulted in the lack of connection between the two forms of Christianity, the electoral bases of Christian democracy from the second half of the 1940s largely overlapped with the members of these associations.²⁶

The most significant mass event, which symbolised the cooperation between the government and the Roman Catholic Church but was also supported by the Christian mass movements and the International Eucharistic Congress in 1938 Budapest whose main organiser was Bangha.

Christian intellectuals

This era produced not only new Christian concepts and mass movements but also brilliant Hungarian Christian intellectuals. The lack of Christian political influence did not stem from the lack of important Christian social thinkers. Apart from those already mentioned, Giesswein, Prohászka, Bangha, and Schütz, the most significant figure was probably István Barankovics (1906-1974). Barankovics, the leading figure of young, progressive Catholic intellectuals managed to combine Catholicism and social justice.²⁷

Fazakas mentions that apart from the representatives of conservative Catholicism like and Catholic followers of fascism, democratic Catholicism, which had no real influence on politics, also tried to organise itself. The Bartha Miklós Society was

formed in 1925 to protest against the pseudo-Christianity and anti-social attitude of Christian nationalism. The Ottokár Prohászka Society was founded in 1931 as an association of young intellectuals that dealt with social questions. Among its members, the most authoritative Christian authors could be found who served as the spiritual basis for Christian democratic thought, these included, Antal Schütz, György Széchenyi, Gyula Szekfű, Sándor Pethő, Sándor Sík, Jenő Katona and Vid Mihelics.²⁸ Fazekas also recalls that Szekfű, Széchenyi and Katona looked for inspiration to French neo-Catholicism. This is how the European Christian democratic ideas, like Jacques Maritain's integral humanism, could enter the Hungarian intellectual horizon. The still-working *Vigilia* magazine from 1935 can be highlighted for its fine arts initiatives. Unfortunately, this Catholic reformism with its social attentiveness, anti-fascism, anti-communism, and democratic spirit, did not receive substantial support from the Church until the end of the Second World War.²⁹

Conclusion

As Bánkuti rightly observes, the Church did not intend to indulge in the technical issues of social and political economy. It considered itself competent only in areas related to moral laws.³⁰ Even for Bangha, who was extremely active in public life and discussed political and social questions, the first ambition was to redeem souls, as Veszprémy points out.³¹ Thus it would not be fair to expect the Church to be political or to analyse political realities from a substantially different viewpoint. Nevertheless, it seems that the attitude of the high priesthood played a decisive role in forming a Christian democratic spirit, and the Horthy regime was a negative example of this influence.

To sum up, at first glance, the Horthy regime seemed to provide a decent environment for establishing a robust Christian democratic movement. The first Teleki-government was Christian socialist in spirit. Furthermore, there were a few significant Christian democratic figures, and the frequent attempts of the Christians resulted in the formation of many political parties. Christianity and (conservative) Catholicism also flourished and became a vital part of politics. Still, Christian democratic movements, like similar many cases in Western Europe,

could not construct a viable political force. Many reasons were suggested for this lack of success. They included: the antagonism between Christianity and secular liberalism/socialism; Bethlen's dominance of Hungarian politics; the attitude of the high clergy; the disintegrative forces in the Christian confessional communities; and the general European tendency to fascism in the 1930s.

Ultimately, it may be concluded that in the Horthy regime, the dominant political culture was Christian nationalism which did not afford any political space for Christian democratic movements. Thus, Fazekas aptly concludes that a historian of modern Hungary investigating Christian democracy, will turn to figures before (like Giesswein, Prohászka) or after (like Barankovics) the Horthy-regime and not to the interwar period.³² It belongs to the tragedy of Hungarian history that a sincere Christian democratic attempt at reform which was born on the periphery of the Horthy regime, framed István Barankovics, was subsequently doomed by the communist takeover. This short but highly significant period (1944-1949) will be explored in our next analysis.

Bibliography

- BÁNKUTI Gábor: A keresztényszocializmus. In *Árkádia Folyóirat Website*. <http://arkadiafolyoirat.hu/index.php/5-eszmetortenet/79-a-keresztényszocializmus-jo>, Accessed 14. 02. 2023.
- INVERNIZZI ACCETTI, Carlo: What is Christian Democracy? Politics, Religion and Ideology. Cambridge - New York, Cambridge University Press, 2019. 385 pp.
- ERDŐDY Gábor: A magyarországi kereszténydemokrácia gyökerei és alternatívái. In *Antall József Baráti Társaság Website*. http://www.antalljosef.hu/hu/a_magyarorszag_i_keresztenydemokracia_gyokerei_es_alternativai. Accessed 14. 02. 2023.
- GALI Máté: Bethlen István Eszmei Arcéle In *Kommentár* 2021/1. <http://kommentar.info.hu/cikk/2021/1/bethlen-istvan-eszmei-arcele>. Accessed 9. February 2023
- GERGELY Jenő: A kereszténydemokrácia Magyarországon, In *Múltunk*, 2007/3. 113-154.
- SZABÓ Róbert: A modern kereszténydemokrácia megjelenése Magyarországon 1944-1949. In *70 éves a Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt* (szerk. Pálffy István) Barankovics István Alapítvány, Budapest, 2014. 11-47.
- VESZPRÉMY László Bernát: Egy avítt jezsuita antijudaista. In *Történelmi Szemle* 2017/3. 439-463
- FAZEKAS Csaba: Collaborating with Horthy: Political Catholicism and Christian Political Organizations in Hungary In *Political Catholicism in Europe 1918-1945*. (Wolfram Kaiser & Helmut Wahnout [eds.]) Vol 1. 2005 edition Routledge: London and New York 160-177.
- MAGYAR KATOLIKUS LEXIKON: Keresztényszociális Néppárt. In *Magyar Katolikus Lexikon Online Version*. Available at: <http://lexikon.katolikus.hu/K/Kereszt%C3%A9nyszoci%C3%A1lis%20N%C3%A9pp%C3%A1rt.html>, Accessed 4 november 2022.
- Pope Pius XI: Quadragesimo Anno In *Vatican.va*. https://www.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno.html Accessed 14. 02. 2023.

Endnotes

- 1 Jewish religion, similar to Roman Catholic, also became an acknowledged religion, thus, in legal terms became equal.
- 2 Bánkuti Gábor: A keresztényszocializmus. In *Árkádia Folyóirat Website*. <http://arkadiafolyoirat.hu/index.php/5-eszmetortenet/79-a-keresztényszocializmus-jo>, Accessed 9. February 2023
- 3 Fazekas Csaba: Collaborating with Horthy: Political Catholicism and Christian Political Organizations in Hungary In Wolfram Kaiser & Helmut Wohnout (eds.) *Political Catholicism in Europe 1918-1945*. Vol 1. Routledge: London and New York.
- 4 Bánkuti
- 5 This argument is in line with the articles of Csaba Fazekas, Gábor Erdődy, and Róbert Szabó. Probably the most compact article on the topic is from Fazekas, and this analysis also heavily relies on his ideas.
- 6 Fazekas, 2004. 164.
- 7 For a short article on Antal Schütz's book entitled *Hungarian Vitality*, see <https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/reviews/a-mandatory-reading-for-hungarian-politicians-antal-schutzs-hungarian-vitality/>. Accessed 9. February 2023
- 8 Fazekas, 2004. 166.
- 9 Fazekas, 2004. 168.
- 10 Fazekas, 2004. 167.
- 11 Fazekas, 2004, 162.
- 12 Erdődy Gábor: A magyarországi kereszténydemokrácia gyökerei és alternatívái. In Antall József Baráti Társaság Website. http://www.antalljosef.hu/hu/a_magyarorszag_i_keresztenydemokracia_gyokerei_es_alternativai. Accessed 14. 02. 2023.
- 13 Szabó Róbert: A modern kereszténydemokrácia megjelenése Magyarországon 1944-1949. In 70 éves a Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (szerk. Pálffy István) Barankovics István Alapítvány, Budapest, 2014. 12.
- 14 Fazekas, 2004, 166.
- 15 Gali Máté: Bethlen István Eszmei Arcéle In *Kommentár* 2021/1. <http://kommentar.info.hu/cikk/2021/1/bethlen-istvan-eszmei-arcele>. Accessed 9. February 2023
- 16 Fazekas, 2004. 167.
- 17 Gergely Jenő: A kereszténydemokrácia Magyarországon, In *Múltunk*, 2007/3. 113-154.
- 18 Gergely 2007. 128.
- 19 Fazekas explains that the ineffectiveness of the Christian Party resulted in the growing number of Catholic movements that were not supported by the clergy, see Fazekas, 2004. 171.
- 20 For a longer elaboration of subsidiarity, solidarism and corporatism and their role in Christian Democratic Ideology, see Invernizzi Accetti, Carlo: *What is Christian Democracy? Politics, Religion and Ideology*. Cambridge - New York, Cambridge University Press, 2019. 385 pp. or our summary of the book entitled [Principles of Christian Democratic Ideology](#).
- 21 Invernizzi Accetti, 2019. 151-152.
- 22 Pope Pius XI: *Quadragesimo Anno* In *Vatican.va*. https://www.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno.html Accessed 14. 02. 2023.
- 23 Invernizzi Accetti, 2019. 128-130. One of its Hungarian representatives was the Jesuit László Varga (1901-1974). Péter Zachar highlights that Varga tried to find solutions for the social crisis in the 1930s based on the social encyclicals *Rerum Novarum* and *Quadragesimo Anno*. In finding a

proper role for the state, not just the entrepreneur attitude and private property but social attentiveness and reform spirit should be maintained. Building society on vocational orders was at the centre of his thought; solidarism and subsidiarity were also crucial characteristics. See Zachar Péter Krisztián: A magyar kereszténydemokrácia egy elfeledett apostola. Jel: Keresztény Értelmiségiek Szövetségének Lapja (Online). 2016. 08. 08. https://www.jelujsag.hu/a-magyar-keresztenydemokracia-egy-elfeledett-apostola#_edn24. Accessed 14. 02. 2023.

24 Gergely 2007. 133.

25 Fazekas, 2004. 173.

26 Gergely 2007. 133.

27 Gergely 2007. 129.

28 Gergely 2007. 130.

29 Fazekas, 2004. 172.

30 Bánkuti

31 Veszprémy László Bernát: Egy avított jezsuita antijudaista. In Történelmi Szemle 2017/3. 444.

32 Fazekas, 2004. 175.