

The Chinese Search for Cosmopolitan Nationhood

Eric Hendriks

April 2023

The Chinese Search for Cosmopolitan Nationhood

Eric Hendriks

This report for the Danube Institute sketches out China's incipient field of world philosophizing, providing an overview of its main structures and political and philosophical contexts. The field under investigation might prove to be of vital political and ideological relevance in the twenty-first century, as China continues to gain weight geopolitically and is increasingly searching for its own distinct visions on world order, cosmopolitanism, and peaceful international coexistence. Two contexts are central for understanding the new Chinese field of world philosophizing: 1) the field's position within Chinese political thought, and 2) the fields' indebtedness to older regionalist traditions in Eurasia and to Pan-Asianism in particular. Accordingly, the first part of the below report—the section titled “Between Nation and World”—will show how the field forms a secondary, but increasingly influential strand alongside the dominant modernizing-nationalist strand in Chinese political thought. The report's second part will delve into the field's controversial connection to the broader and older Pan-Asian tradition, while also touching upon the parallels with other regionalist geo-philosophical imaginings in Eurasia.

Between Nation and World

Pan-Asian Roots and Regionalist Parallels

Endnotes

Between Nation and World

Since modernity entered China in the mid-nineteenth century, national empowerment has stood at the heart of Chinese political thought. It has been modern China's central political objective to acquire national “wealth and power” (富强). It is the central motif in Xi Jinping's speeches and animated the reform movement of Deng Xiaoping, the Stalinist regime of Mao Zedong, and the writings of earlier modernizing intellectuals such as Kang Youwei, Liang Qiqao, and Chen Duxiu. The phrase “wealth and power” may sound very materialistic, but both sides have a spiritual dimension. China is also to become spiritually prosperous, while power is also the power to interpret and judge things independently. Dignity is crucial. China does not want to be a peripheral, underdeveloped, and abused corner of a world where Western powers, and America in particular, call the shots politically and set the standards ideologically and culturally. For Chinese patriots and according to CCP nomenclature, the Chinese nation should be able to face the world with pride and confidence.

But should not China, therefore, also want to rewire the present world order, and if so, in what way? This question arises now that China is the world's largest industrial producer and the second-largest national economy. The national empowerment process is well-advanced, to say the least: China has already become a very powerful, wholly sovereign nation-state. But does it want to be more than a powerful nation inserting itself into an America-centric world, its communist party-state model forming a political deviation from the dominant liberal-democratic norm of the West? In other words: Does it just want security and some tolerance for its political and cultural otherness, or does it want to recalibrate, reorder, and possibly even re-center the world order?

In recent years, prominent Chinese academics such as Zhao Tingyang (趙汀陽), Xu Jilin (许纪霖), Jiang Shigong (强世功), and Jin Huimin (金惠敏) have been trying to formulate blueprints for exactly such a fundamental global rewiring. They theorize about a new Chinese sense of cosmopolitanism, redefine political universalism, and sketch out visions of a harmonious global future in which Chinese traditional wisdom plays a unique role. There are essential differences among the thinkers mentioned, but all draw on a distinct Chinese tradition of idealism in which harmony—the harmonious co-existence of cultural and political particularities—is the key concept.

This cosmopolitan idealism is a secondary thread in Chinese political thought, alongside the primary focus on national empowerment. However, one should not overestimate the distinction between the two threads; it is more of an analytical tool for mapping out a much more complex ideological landscape. In China's political and political-philosophical discourses, the cosmopolitan idealism and national empowerment strands usually intertwine because the idea of national empowerment entails spiritual growth and domestic harmony, while a confident, empowered China is deemed key to bringing about world harmonization.

To understand both threads, we need to go back to the world imagining of the imperial China that went down in 1911. From the first dynasty, the Qin (221 – 206 BC), to the last dynasty, the Qing (1644 – 1911 AD), China was ruled intermittently by imperial dynasties. In the cosmological view that dominated two millennia of Chinese imperial history, the Chinese core region—*zhōngguó*, the Middle Kingdom—was the world-centering empire. The Chinese emperor, as the “son of heaven,” *tiānzi*, was the connecting point between *tiān*, the heavenly order, and earthly life, the *tiānxià*, “everything under heaven.” Tianxia simultaneously and alternately stood for the human world, the civilized world, the territories under the emperor’s influence, and a harmonious societal order that correctly reflected the harmonious heavenly order. Barbarians regularly invaded from what from the Center appeared to be the far corners of the world, but this did not shake the Sinocentric imperial world imagination. Its centering of civilization and legitimacy in the imperial core, its vision of China as the world-civilization-carrying empire, remained ideologically viable for centuries, at least within China’s (Neo-)Confucian intelligentsia.

The situation changed in the nineteenth century when Western powers invaded. These powers proved militarily, technologically, scientifically, and, as it eventually painfully transpired, organizationally superior. Later, industrialized Japan also came marching in, lusting for territorial expansion. The modern superpowers were snatching bits of China, dividing among themselves the areas with the greatest potential for international trade as if cutting up a pie. Trading ports under foreign authority arose along coasts and rivers. China was dotted with such small European and later larger Japanese colonies, had to sign unequal trade treaties, and lost every war it fought. Nationalist Chinese intellectuals in the early twentieth century later referred to this period as “the Century of Humiliation,” which began in 1839 with the first Sino-British War. The Communist Party later declared that the Century of Humiliation had come to an end with the proclamation of the People’s Republic in 1949 under Mao. The dating is somewhat opportunistic; the end year could also be put earlier or later. But in any case, the term refers to a uniquely humbling phase in Chinese history in which the image of China as the bearer of world civilization proved no longer tenable.

Intellectuals and politicians responded by reinterpreting China as a national state among other states, some of which were much more advanced and powerful. China, they judged, was in dire need of modernization and a patriotic national spirit to hold its own in the march of nations. From this sprang the near-obsessive quest for national empowerment that dominantly shapes Chinese political thought to this day—a quest that, I imagine, must be easy to understand for Hungarian readers, whose modern political tradition also assigns much weight to sovereignty and national emancipation.

But increasingly, there are also moves to resurrect something of the old cosmopolitan, universalizing spirit of imperial China. The old empire is not coming back, but perhaps its ancient harmony ideal can inspire the twenty-first century. The former General Secretary of the Communist Party, Hu Jintao, dropped the term Harmonious World (和谐世界) in a speech in 2005. And around the same time, in mainland Chinese academia, philosopher

Zhou Tingyang founded the Tianxia School of world philosophy, advocating the advent of a tianxia utopia. This tianxia will not be limited to East Asia but involve all of humanity in a harmonious global order in which rivalries will disappear, and cultural and political diversity will be universally respected. Intellectual historian Xu Jilin, another prominent thinker of the Tianxia School, summarizes its credo this way: “We need a form of thought that can act as a counterpoint to nationalism. I call this thought the ‘new tianxia,’ an axial civilizational wisdom that comes from China’s pre-modern tradition, interpreted anew along modern lines.”¹

Zhao and Xu both stress that they are not arguing for a revived Chinese imperialism but that the tianxia they envision will be “de-centered” and “non-hierarchical.” China would not be the leader country; it would stand on an equal footing with other (large) countries. But what complicates their anti-imperialist self-presentation is that they assign an exceptionalist status to Chinese culture and tradition. Xu insists that China must live up to its world-historical mission as a global nation: “China is a cosmopolitan power, a global nation that bears Hegel’s ‘world spirit.’ It must take responsibility for the world and for the ‘world spirit’ it has inherited. This “world spirit” is the new tianxia that will emerge in the form of universal values.” Similarly, Zhao claims that China already carries the seed of a globally harmonized world within itself: “China is a ‘microcosm’ of tianxia because China is a ‘world-patterned state’ that takes tianxia to be internal to its structure.”

Jiang Shigong, an outspoken political philosopher and public intellectual, is even blunter. He prophesizes the rise of a Sinocentric “world empire 2.0” that is to replace the current Anglo-American world empire (see his essay “超大型政治实体的内在逻辑”).² It is beholden to China’s political tradition, he contends, that China should transcend the level of nations and act on behalf of the world as a whole. “Classical Chinese politics has always pursued the universalism of ‘taking the world as one’s own,’ only having the perspective of ‘the world’ and ‘civilization,’ not a narrowly national or ethnic one.” He asserts that there is no risk that an ecumenical, globe-leading China would dominate other cultures, countries, and political systems because Chinese culture is essentially non-dominating in character. In contrast to Western culture, which seeks to drive through its positions at the expense of others, Chinese culture harmonizes antagonisms, or so Jiang argues (see his essay “哲学与历史”).³

In contrast, literary theorist Jin Huimin rejects this kind of cultural chauvinism. Jin’s position is that China will be a genuinely cosmopolitan—or, in his wording: universal—nation exactly when it accepts that it is just a nation alongside other nations and gives up on exceptionalist claims. Ironically, he identifies such claims as nationalistic. “China ... has witnessed the breeding of cultural nationalism in the wake of its growing economic, military, and political influence. For those cultural nationalists, Chinese culture is far superior to its Western counterpart: the former is a paragon of virtue, while the latter is

rotten and in decline.”⁴ The irony here is that the thinkers dismissed by Jin as nationalistic—philosophers such as Jiang—actually strive to overcome nationalism by transcending the nation. In the end, all the here-discussed theorists claim to oppose nationalism, but what they mean by this differs wildly.

So, in contemporary Chinese political discourse, the relations between the categories of China, nation, and world are very much under dispute. Much is on the move, politically and philosophically. In the twenty-first century, an arisen China will again have to search for its role in the global order, an order it might be able to reshape fundamentally, which raises profound ideological questions. Does China want to be just another large country? Can it be just that? Would it accept such a mundane status? Or does China long to be the exemplary world nation, and, if so, of what kind of world?

Pan-Asian Roots and Regionalist Parallels⁵

To understand contemporary Chinese world theorizing, it is crucial to place it alongside other regionalisms and in the Pan-Asian tradition, on which Chinese world theorizing draws heavily, albeit implicitly, due to Pan-Asianism’s troubled history. Pan-Asianism, or its political variety, painted an essentialist dualism of a domineering West and a harmonizing Asian East, and claims that Asia should lead the way in harmonizing the world. Ideologically, it hovers ambivalently between “nationalism, regionalism, and universalism”⁶, forming a “kind of regional universalism.”⁷ Different varieties of Pan-Asianism had gained widespread international popularity after Japan’s 1905-victory in the Russo-Japanese War. Throughout Asia’s European colonies and in China, anti-colonial and revolutionary intellectuals had received the victory as a win for Asia.⁸ “We regarded that Russian defeat by Japan as the defeat of the West by the East,” Sun Yat-Sen shares in 1924 in his famous Kobe speech on Pan-Asianism.⁹ Sun, China’s leading revolutionary at the time and the *pater patriae* of modern China, in front of a Japanese audience of Pan-Asianists, celebrated Pan-Asianism as a remedy to “European oppression.”¹⁰ He dismissed the latter as “the Rule of Might” (*bàdào*) and claimed that the Eastern tradition, by contrast, taught the benevolent “Kingly Way” (*wángdào*)¹¹, applying to geopolitics a conceptual pair deriving from Mencius and Xunzi.

Yet, Sun’s warning that an industrialized Japan conscious of its historical task thus should never act like “a hawk” toward its Asian brothers was to no avail.¹² Tragically, during the Second World War, the Pan-Asian narrative of Asian brotherhood even served as the pivotal propaganda doctrine of Japan’s Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere (1940–1945). This imagined geocultural Sphere, which consisted of the territories conquered by Japan in China and Southeast Asia from 1931 on, supposedly united the Asian peoples in liberty and harmony as a prelude to global peace. One of its central slogans was *Hakkō ichiu*, “The eight corners of the world under one roof,” which denoted a vision of a world harmonized by a Japanese-led Asia. The phrase has a contrived Japanese source, but

conceptually, Hakkō ichiu refurbished the old Chinese imperial notion of Tianxia for Japanese use. “It was a modern version of the traditional ideology of the Chinese Empire, [...] but this time with Japan at its apex,” writes historian Miwa Kimitada.¹³

Though this conceptual recentering on Japan obviously served political interests, wartime Japanese Pan-Asianism was always more than mere propagandistic sloganeering, also possessing idealistic and intellectual features. Its most imperialist-minded and intellectual supporters were very idealistic, which, far from a contradiction in terms, follows from imperialism being a type of ideology. Every ideology posits ideals. Once posited, ideals serve both to idealize and to evaluate existing power constellations. The contrarian general and Pan-Asian ideologue Ishiwara Kanji, for example, had a “genuine belief in Japan’s global mission as world savior” and therefore reproved the brutality of the Japanese military occupation policies for dramatically falling short of his ideal of an egalitarian, voluntaristic Asian brotherhood.¹⁴

The philosophers of the Kyoto School had similarly high-flown ideals, foreseeing a world in which the cultural particularity of each of the world’s many nations is respected. Such a world, they believed, would naturally center on Japan since it was unique in having an “empty” national essence that was both particular and particularity-transcending. The School’s founder, Nishida Kitaro wrote in 1943 that Imperial Japan “contains the principle of world formation, that is, the principle of ‘Eight corners, one world,’” carrying within itself a “formative globalism” that “contrasts with Anglo-American imperialism and federalism that colonize others.”¹⁵ It was therefore Japan’s “unique moral mission and responsibility” to liberate the East Asia peoples; destroy the current “unreal and abstract” universalisms, all of which fail to affirm the particularity of “each nation/people”; and create, for the first time in history, “the real world,” the truly “worldly world” (*sekaiteki sekai*).¹⁶

In the end, none of the idealistic visions and philosophizing changed the reality on the ground in Japan’s Asian colonies, which was one of militarized domination. And after 1945, the tainted Pan-Asian label disappeared from East Asian political discourse with the Japanese war machine that had appropriated and discredited it.

Still, the pan movements of old, Pan-Asianism included, left powerful Romantic and anti-western legacies. They persist, in fragmented and diffused forms, in today’s political regionalisms, often going under new names, such as in the nineties with Singapore’s championing of “Asian values.”¹⁷ All non-western civilizational states inspire or propagate one or more such regionalist political ideologies and do so by virtue of being civilizational states. “Socialism with Chinese characteristics,” the CCP’s official doctrine, stands alongside India’s Hinduness (*Hindutva*) and the Russian idea (*Russkaya ideya*). Also, there is the fateful notion of the Russian world (*Russkiy mir*); Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine form “the parts of what is essentially the same historical and spiritual space,” proclaims a 2021-essay by Putin.¹⁸ But most explicit is the historical continuity in the case of the Eurasianism that has been prominent for three decades in Russian far-right circles. Eurasianism, which derives from the 1920s, calls for the unification of a Russo-centric Eurasian cultural zone to counteract the world-disfiguring dominance of the liberal Atlantic world.¹⁹ Each of these

regionalisms—whether they are marginalized, in opposition to the government, or official state doctrine—stakes a regionalist culture claim, one that typically comes in more particularistic and chauvinistically exceptionalist variants.

Conceptual fragments of Pan-Asianism live on in contemporary Chinese world conceptions. Occasionally, there are even rare calls for East Asian brotherhood in the old Pan-Asian style. In 2015, intellectual historian Xu Jilin, one of the main theorists of Tianxia, argued that the various East Asian nations should, through intercultural dialogue and civility, create “the new universal values of East Asia” (*dōngyà xīn de pǔbiàn xìng jiàzhí*).²⁰ In this way, they can together form a harmonized “people’s East Asia” (*mínjiān de dōngyà*), which, in turn, will serve as the foundation for a peaceful Tianxia world. It reminds of ethnologist Komatsu Kentaro’s 1943-vision of a “the Greater East Asia ethnic nations as a single ethnic nation.”²¹ But in contrast to how mid-century Japanese Pan-Asianism usually imagined Japan as the teacher and leader of the other East Asian peoples²², Xu pictured Chinese as harmonizing with their East Asian neighbors in full equality.²³ This corresponds to the egalitarian Pan-Asianism that was prevalent throughout East Asia at the turn the twentieth-century and persisted as a minority position into mid-century Japanese Pan-Asianism.²⁴

More broadly influential is Pan-Asianism’s conceptual core, its dualism of an imperious, imperialistic West and a harmonious, harmonizing East. This was Sun’s *bàdào*, the Rule of Might, versus *wángdào*, the Confucian notion of the Kingly Way; which translated to *hadō* versus *ōdō* in Japanese Pan-Asianism.²⁵ The same basic duality reappears, though without acknowledgment of the Pan-Asian source, in both the Tianxia School and Jiang Shigong’s interpretation of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

Within the Tianxia School, the duality takes the form of faux universalisms that missionize and seek to dominate or negate others, on the one hand, and an emerging, truly universal Tianxia world, inspired by ancient Chinese governance wisdom, on the other. In the rendering of Zhao Tingyang, the Tianxia School’s standard bearer, there rages a cosmic, Manichean battle between two world-historical traditions of worlding. “The world order has two traditions: imperialism invented by the Romans and the Tianxia system invented by China.”²⁶ At stake is “the distinction between a unilateral universalism and a compatible or inclusive universalism.”²⁷ The unilateral or Roman mode of universalization is key to Western civilization, manifesting in Christian missionizing and the vilification of pagans and heterodoxies, the instrumental use of human rights criticism to violate countries’ sovereignty, and “American imperialism.”²⁸ Because it claims universality for itself, excludes others from the universal, and demonizes those that resist this imposition, Roman unilateralism creates “oppositional conflicts” and puts “the basic [Schmittian] distinction between friend and enemy ... at the heart of all political concepts.”²⁹ The emerging Tianxia world, by contrast, will not universalize particulars—will not force values upon others—but instead be a universality of people and nations relating harmoniously and inclusively to one another. “The Tianxia system tries to construct a sharable system” of global “guardianship” that “must be anti-imperialistic and anti-hegemonic.”³⁰

Xu Jilin works with the same dichotomy of universalisms, contrasting the future Tianxia's true universality of equally included cultures, nations, and regions with universalisms that seek to dominate or transcend the other. "Behind both domination and transcendence," Xu writes, "lies a lack of recognition and respect for the uniqueness and pluralism of others."³¹ Domination is when you declare your culture universal and seek to erase others thereby. Transcendence is when you place your cultural values on a meta-level raised above other cultures. Xu mentions liberalism as an example of the latter. Liberalism attempts "in a 'value-neutral' way, to transcend the particularism of both the self and other."³² But it universalizes specific cultural values, demonstrated by the fact that liberal human rights discourse "has appeared to be too substantive" for "many axial civilizations." Liberalism's claim to universality, thus, "disregards the internal differences that exist between different cultures and civilizations."³³

More than Zhao, Xu complicates the correspondence of China/West to good/bad universalism by stressing the extent to which contemporary China is falling short of the Tianxia ideal. Zhao also holds that, "Today's China is a sovereign nation-state and is not a tianxia."³⁴ But it is Xu who weaponizes the polemical potential of the 'future Tianxia' discourse against China's current political conditions. He notes first that China is internally governed unharmoniously and provokes neighboring countries. "[Et]hnic and religious conflicts continually erupt in Tibet and Xinjiang" and "[n]ationalism has reached soaring heights not just in China but throughout East Asia." Also, the chauvinistic nationalism in contemporary Chinese political culture "looks very patriotic, giving pride of place to China, but in fact, it is very 'un-Chinese' and untraditional." Xu explains that "China's civilizational tradition was not nationalistic, but rather grounded in tianxia, whose values were universal and humanistic rather than particular." A nationalistic China that defines itself in opposition to the West, saying "this is Western, and this is Chinese," forsakes its unique world-historical mission as the inheritor of Tianxia. "China is a cosmopolitan power, a global nation that bears Hegel's 'world spirit.' It must take responsibility for the world and for the 'world spirit' it has inherited. This 'world spirit' is the new tianxia that will emerge in the form of universal values."³⁵

Strikingly, therefore, the field's leading theorists all claim the true universality *and* hold that this is the universality that is most open to worldwide politico-cultural diversity. Correspondingly, their world conceptions challenge Western-centric ones on both flanks, claiming to be more attuned to politico-cultural particularism *and* more universalistic. Still, their respective emphases lay out a spectrum. Jin is near the field's particularistic pole. Though he speaks much about universality, he does not grant it any positive substance beyond that of particularity well-understood. Jiang claims the universal on behalf of an exceptionalist cultural particular, which places him in an unstable intermediary position. Tianxia theorists Zhao and Xu formulate a universalistic vision of a future world order that will in no way be specifically Chinese, other than that the historical inspiration for this future order happens to lie in Chinese antiquity.

¹ Xu Jilin, “The New Tianxia,” quoted on the *Translating the Chinese Dream* blog (Mark McConaghy, Tang Xiaobing, and David Ownby trans.), <https://www.readingthechinadream.com/xu-jilin-the-new-tianxia.html> (cited on 21 Aug. 2022).

² Jiang Shigong, “Chāo dàxíng zhèngzhì shítǐ de nèizài luójí: ‘Dìguó’ yǔ shìjiè zhìxù” in *Wénhuà Zònghéng* (2019), <http://www.aisixiang.com/data/115799-3.html>, cited on 21 Jul. 2022, p. 3.

³ 这种例外主义恰恰展现出中国文化与西方文化的不同，即西方文化始终试图在二元对立中最终克服矛盾对立而追求绝对的一，而中国文化始终强调对立中的统一与包容，从而形成多元一体的和合理念。因此，“中国方案”的雄心恰恰在于立足中国文明传统来吸收世界上所有文明的长处，从而推动中国文明传统的现代性转化，最终建立超越西方文明并包容西方文明的人类文明新秩序。Jiang Shigong, “Zhéxué yǔ lǐshǐ: cóng dǎng de shíjiǔ dà bàogào jiědú ‘xíjīnpíng shídài’” in *Kāifàng shídài* (2018), <http://m.aisixiang.com/data/107999-4.html>, cited on 21 Jul. 2022.

⁴ Jin Huimin, “Cultural Self-Confidence and Constellated Community: An Extended Discussion of Some Speeches by Xi Jinping,” *Telos* 195 (summer 2021): pp. 93–113; here, p. 102.

⁵ This section is drawn up from text segments that previously appeared in: Eric Hendriks-Kim, “The Polemics of China’s Counter Cosmopolitanisms.” 2022. *Telos* 201. “Liberal Empire and Civilizational States.” 13–37.

⁶ Miwa Kimitada, “Pan-Asianism in Modern Japan: Nationalism, Regionalism and Universalism” in Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann ed., *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders* (London: Routledge 2004), pp. 21–33; here, p. 21.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 28.

⁸ Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007) pp. 121–123 and pp. 161–190.

⁹ Sun Yat Sen, *China and Japan: Natural Friends, Unnatural Enemies* (Shanghai: China United Press, 1941) 150. The 1924-speech was delivered in Mandarin by Sun but then quickly translated to Japanese for the print publication.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 151.

¹³ Miwa, “Pan-Asianism in Modern Japan,” p. 21.

¹⁴ On July 7, 1938, Ishiwara, speaking to students at Kenkoku University, the Pan-Asian elite university in the Japanese colony of Manchukuo, stated that “ethnic harmony” was not emerging in the colony “because the Japanese are acting from a sense of superiority and dominating the peoples of other ethnicities.” Kishida, Yuka Hiruma. *Kenkoku University and the Experience of Pan-Asianism: Education in the Japanese Empire* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing 2020) p. 35; compare p. 11 and p. 25.

¹⁵ Nishida Kitaro, “The principle of the new world order” in: Arisaka Yoko, “The Nishida enigma. ‘The principle of the new world order’,” *Monumenta Nipponica* 51.1 (1996 [1943]): pp. 81–105; here, p. 102, p. 103.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* p. 104, f96.

¹⁷ Sven Saaler, Pan-Asianism in “Modern Japanese History: Overcoming the Nation, Creating a Region, Forging an Empire” in Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann ed., *Pan-Asianism in modern Japanese history: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders* (London: Routledge 2004), pp. 1–18; here, 2.

¹⁸ Vladimir Putin, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” 12 Jul. 2021, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181> (cited on 22 Jul. 2022).

¹⁹ Mark Bassin, Sergey Glebov, and Marlene Laruelle, ed. *Between Europe and Asia: The Origins, Theories, and Legacies of Russian Eurasianism* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press 2015).

²⁰ Xu Jilin, “Xīn tiānxià zhǔyì: Chóngjiàn zhōngguó de nèiwài zhìxù” in Xu Jilin and Liu Qing ed., *Xīn tiānxià zhǔyì, zhīshì fēnzǐ lùn cóng* 13 (2015), <http://www.aisixiang.com/data/91702-1.html> (cited on 23 dec. 2021).

²¹ “*Dai toa minzoku o hitotsu no minzoku to miru konpon-teki no joken.*” Komatsu Kentaro, “Dai Toa minzoku no keisei” in Ogawa. Yataro, ed., *Nihon minzoku to shin sekai kan* (Osaka: Kazuraki Shoten, 1943) 109–110.

²² Roger H. Brown, “Visions of a Virtuous Manifest Destiny: Yasuoka Masahiro and Japan’s Kingly Way” in Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann ed., *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders* (London: Routledge 2004), pp. 133–150.

²³ Xu Jilin, “Xīn tiānxià zhǔyì.”

²⁴ Kishida, *Kenkoku University*, p. 11 and p. 25. Saaler, “Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History” 2. Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia* pp. 111–119.

²⁵ During the forties, the more chauvinistic Japanese nationalists called the good side of the duality *kōdō*, the justly “Imperial Way,” to avoid the Confucian connotations of *ōdō*, obscuring their debt to Chinese philosophy. Brown, “Visions of a Virtuous Manifest Destiny” 142. Kishida, *Kenkoku University* 27.

²⁶ Zhao Tingyang, *Redefining A Philosophy for World Governance*, Tao Liqing translation from Mandarin (Singapore: Palgrave 2019), p. 11.

²⁷ Zhao Tingyang, *All Under Heaven: The Tianxia System for a Possible World Order* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press 2016), p. 217.

²⁸ Zhao *Redefining* 72, *All Under Heaven*, p. 203 and p. 214.

²⁹ Ibid. *All Under Heaven*, p. 4.

³⁰ Ibid. p. 11, p. 239.

³¹ Xu Jilin, “The New Tianxia,” quoted on the *Translating the Chinese Dream* blog (Mark McConaghy, Tang Xiaobing, and David Ownby trans.), <https://www.readingthechinadream.com/xu-jilin-the-new-tianxia.html> (cited on 21 Aug. 2022).

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ *All Under Heaven*, p. 244.

³⁵ Xu, “The New Tianxia.”