




Hungary Helps: Plateau State
and an Opportunity for Other
ODA Agencies

Dániel Farkas



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Image: Statue of Michael Okpara, the nation's youngest premier Enugu, Nigeria



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About the Danube Institute

The Danube Institute, established in 2013 by the Batthyány Lajos Foundation in Budapest, serves as a hub for the exchange of ideas and individuals within Central Europe and between Central Europe, other parts of Europe, and the English-speaking world. Rooted in a commitment to respectful conservatism in cultural, religious, and social life, the Institute also upholds the broad classical liberal tradition in economics and a realistic Atlanticism in national security policy. These guiding principles are complemented by a dedication to exploring the interplay between democracy and patriotism, emphasising the nation-state as the cornerstone of democratic governance and international cooperation.

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About the Author



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Hungary Helps: Plateau State and an Opportunity for Other ODA Agencies

Dániel Farkas

Abstract

Government-backed Official Development Assistance (ODA) agencies face several challenges - not least scarcity of resources. This raises an obvious question: how can ODA agencies from smaller countries in Central Europe and elsewhere have the greatest impact in 2026 and beyond? This paper provides an answer by examining the work of the ODA agency Hungary Helps in Plateau State, which is located in Nigeria's Middle Belt. This paper builds on the research in a Danube Institute paper of 2025. Crucial aspects that are considered in this paper include: the importance of Plateau State; the nature of the problems; factors that make it easier for ODA agencies to achieve successful outcomes and the actual and potential activities of Hungary Helps. The paper concludes that ODA agencies from other Visegrád Four (V4) countries in Central Europe - or, indeed, from further afield - can increase the likelihood of success by focusing their work on key locations such as the example presented in this paper.

Introduction: ODA Flows Back at 2015 Levels

In 2026, the news from Official Development Assistance (ODA) agencies in OECD countries is grim. Contributions fell by 23.1% in 2025. Grants (i.e. contributions that do not have to be repaid) drove this, dropping by 29.1%.¹ Of course, flows from the United States, including aid to Ukraine, accounted for much of this. Taking a longer view, aid flows from ODA agencies in OECD countries have slipped to levels that are similar to those of 2015.²

Flows to Sub-Saharan Africa contracted by 26.3%, more than the overall decrease.³ As in the world economy in general, the era of “cheap money” is over. Not only is the overall level of ODA falling, but also a greater portion is going into concessional loans, which are at least partially reimbursable, rather than outright grants.⁴

The essential problem is that the availability of funds in the developed countries has fallen. In an “America First” world, the U.S Government is reconsidering all of its commitments elsewhere. Member states of the European Union (EU) are dealing with the implications of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Public finances in many countries are threatened by the most recent conflict around the Strait of Hormuz.

Concepts of international solidarity and international aid need to reflect this new reality of relative resource scarcity. Decision-makers need to prioritise issues and consider how developed countries can still make an impact with more modest resources than before.

Along the way, reassessments of development goals on different timetables are overdue as well.

Policy-makers responsible for disbursing ODA funds always seek positive outcomes. In the current environment, the question of how an ODA agency has the greatest impact becomes more acute.

This question is especially relevant for policy-makers in the Visegrád Four (V4) countries of Central Europe. These countries are comparatively small, yet have some advantages. For instance they have experienced generally good economic growth over the last two decades.

They are well integrated into Western financial systems, but can operate in the developing world without the historical geopolitical baggage of larger countries. Further, and as is discussed in this paper, their ODA agencies - Hungary Helps included - have gained valuable experience already.

This paper seeks to find an answer to the key question by building on research undertaken by the Danube Institute in 2025.⁵ This paper looks at the activities of Hungary Helps in the Plateau State of Nigeria’s Middle Belt. It explains Plateau State’s problems and importance. It discusses what Hungary Helps is doing and could do in conjunction with other organisations and established networks. Finally, this paper provides suggestions for ODA agencies from other V4 countries (and, indeed, further afield).



ex-Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki arriving to attend in a Meeting of the European Political Community in Prague, Czechia (Shutterstock)

Plateau State and Why It Really Matters

Plateau State is one of the relatively small states of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, in the region that is traditionally called the “Middle Belt” of the country, roughly lying along the central axis of the country from west to east, on the southern part of the savannah ecological belt. The state’s territory is largely covered by the eponymous Jos Plateau.

Its population can only be calculated by guesswork, given that a population explosion is underway, and there has been no official census since the notoriously unreliable one of 2001. All in all, its population is now generally estimated to be around the 4.5-5 million figure.⁶ It is far from the largest state in Nigeria by this measure: several other states have estimated populations over 8 million. Still, Plateau State’s geographical location makes it a crucial element of the national map. It is where east-west, north-south and southwest-northeast transportation axes intersect. Further, it is a hotspot for herder-farmer and inter-religious violence.

The violence is especially relevant to our story, but let us first reflect on the question of why we are focusing on this particular location in the larger question of ODA in Africa.

First, consider the location. Sub-Saharan Africa, at this point in history, can be said to be a traditional recipient of large amounts of ODA.

The region suffers from chronic state-building issues: this is no surprise given that the nation states of today have to work with borders that were defined in the colonial era. The instability of these states makes them a hotbed of terrorism and illegal migration, which is subject to close attention by the developed nations - in Europe especially. In recent months, multiple European nations have participated in military exercises across Northern Africa,⁷ honing their desert/bush warfare skills and building lines of cooperation with local armed forces.

These exercises are now seen as being normal. Nevertheless, a planned, but later (and possibly finally) scrapped Hungarian anti-terrorist military intervention in Chad was the subject of much public scrutiny in Hungary.

Considering all this, it is clear the region is not just another building block in the global system, in which Central Europe in general and Hungary in particular need to find their way. As the International Crisis Group has noted, the northern part of Sub-Saharan Africa is home to a number of slow-burning crises that merit special attention from governments in Europe.⁸

Many of the issues that contribute to a lack of security in the broader Sahel are evident in Nigeria - an exceptionally complex country with hundreds of different ethnic groups. First, one may classify it simply on a North-South or Muslim-Christian basis. Then one may go with a four-way analysis, with the historical Yoruba and Igbo lands in the south, the Hausa/Fulani (roughly) northwest and Kanuri (broadly) northeast being the important poles.

However, it is not possible to draw even approximate borders between these regional entities. Climatic and ethnic/tribal boundaries do matter, but they tend to be unclear and/or unimportant on the ground. Further, there are too many subsets of regional identities to say exactly who lives where.

One can still go, however, with a very rough north-south delineation, but not as clear regional borders, but in terms of lifestyles. One can say these two different lifestyles are the settled, mostly Christian farmers generally in the south and the nomadic, pastoralist Muslims mainly in the north. These categories apply only very roughly, and mostly in the countryside, not in urban centers. Still, they constitute the key issue, which is the ever-intensifying violence in the countryside, mostly inflicted by pastoralists on farmers, and at times, vice versa as well.

The Middle Belt of Nigeria, which includes Plateau State, is at the heart of this conflict. This is the place where the different lifestyles of densely settled and agricultural communities and herder nomads clash the most. Herders and settled villages coexist in the arid North as well, with banditry being a huge problem there too.⁹ Conversely, herders can be found in the tropical forest zone, near the Gulf of Guinea, where they look for new markets for beef.¹⁰

However, the Middle Belt is the center of the problem, where one sees relatively large groups of herders penetrating a region that is largely already settled, and where the herders are seen as intruders. In Plateau State, these are mostly members of the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere tribes,¹¹ especially in the northern part where herders are the most active.

This violence persists and is part of the daily life of the state. While many other hotspots can be named, Plateau State was the location of the latest high-profile attacks where Christian communities suffered, in the now-infamous Palm Sunday attack.¹² Such violence is, sadly, becoming a new normal for Christian feast days. Plateau State is a troubled and complex part of a troubled and complex (and, in regional terms, very important) country.

Nigeria is also a country with huge economic and human potential and a relatively healthy economy. The naira is now moving toward full convertibility. Further, it is very illustrative that the local economy and society faced the impact of the USAID closure consciously. While many issues persist (as we highlighted last year¹³), the Federal government moved to increase, for example, the education budget: all the while, a huge private fundraising effort started as well, led by the oil magnate Aliko Dangote.¹⁴

In other words, Plateau State is part of a country that can and should be crucial to regional stability. However, for Nigeria to reach its potential, the problems of Plateau State need to be solved.

*A woman in praying to God in a Church Lagos, Nigeria
(Shutterstock)*



Many Problems, Many ODA Agencies, Many Networks and Little State Presence

Plateau State, in a country where it is often hard to access the rural centres and hard to closely monitor what is happening in the field, is a relatively well-endowed area in terms of ODA, with a lot of international organisations having local offices in the provincial capital, Jos. This explains the relatively high concentration of foreigners in the city, with potentially more than a hundred Western missionaries and aid workers residing there. Two factors explain this. One is the relative closeness of the city to Abuja, the national capital, where most foreigners arrive by air: the other is the relatively mild climate, given that Jos sits 1,220 metres above sea level on the plateau, which reduces the incidence of otherwise rampant tropical diseases.

Also important is the work of several organisations in Plateau State, which makes the state easier for foreigners to understand. One is the Stefanos Foundation. Working with European funding, it is providing aid: at the same time, it also possesses up-to-date, detailed data on the ongoing killings in the Plateau State countryside.¹⁵ The Catholic church also maintains (as in other states of Nigeria) a Justice, Development and Peace Commission, which is working closely with local agencies and overseeing the distribution of certain development and aid supplies by the Church. Many other organisations are involved with ODA in Plateau State.

This network is apparently already being used by Hungarian state authorities to distribute aid. Hungary Helps has been present in the country since 2019, with most of the aid distributed through Catholic dioceses. However, in the same year, it also funded a major aid program to the tune of US\$500,000, in which the Jos-based Church of Christ in Nations (COCIN) distributed construction materials and seeds for internal refugees participating in resettlement programs. In that year, various organisations funded the distribution of materials for no less than 38,000 internally displaced people (IDPs).

In Plateau State, this was targeted at the Barkin Ladi community to the south of the provincial capital Jos.¹⁶

However, this aid, while clearly life-saving for many people, does not solve structural problems. The core problem is that the Nigerian state has too little presence in areas where it should be maintaining safety and security.

Locals clearly see this. On 21 April, local people of the aforementioned Berom tribe attacked and destroyed a local Army checkpoint over the armed forces' perceived lack of protection for their fellow villager, Gyang Nuhu Choji, who had died in a herder attack a couple of days earlier.¹⁷

This is the same dynamic noted by our report last year. Insecurity makes the state weaker, which exacerbates the impact of these same problems on local communities. People in these communities then react to this by turning on the state.

The strength of the local communities means that, at a time of resource scarcity, they can be force multipliers for organisations that are providing foreign aid. Using earlier networks built by Hungary Helps, Hungary and other Central European countries cooperating with it can potentially reach out to local communities to identify key areas — where the Nigerian state and society can be strengthened to offer protection against insecurity. State-level politicians understand this as well.

Both of the main political parties in Plateau State (the ruling APC and the opposition PDP) know that they need to demonstrate commitment to curbing the violence. In short, the opportunity exists for improving the overall situation. There are earlier experiences, well-established networks and goodwill at the local level.



Catholic nuns and women celebrating a church ceremony, Onitsha Nigeria (Shutterstock)

ODA in Plateau State: Projects and Possibilities

The resettlement of internal refugees in Plateau State, which Hungary Helps contributed to, is still a major issue in the state. The insecurity drives people to internal refugee camps, where they are dependent on the supply chains of direct international and local aid for their lives. Plateau State at the moment is not the state with the most IDPs, but correct numbers are hard to find, as a lot of these people are not in officially established camps. The issue is still critical, with around 65,000 people officially designated as IDPs in the state.¹⁸ Da Jacob Gyang Buba, the most important traditional ruler of the state, or Gbong Gwon Jos, openly asked Nigeria's President Bola Ahmed Tinubu in his latest visit to the state to "intervene in the return of the IDPs to their ancestral homes".¹⁹

Various projects are underway (or are being planned) in the Middle Belt of Nigeria to resettle such communities. This resettlement should be done in a way that enhances the IDPs' general standard of living (with water and electricity systems being constructed) and boosts security at the same time. This can only be done via careful planning and the diligent use of local sources. With the dense network of local aid agencies and religious groups, this is an area that is relatively high-risk, but high-reward: Plateau State is a place where Central European aid agencies can make an impact. The resettlement projects can be undertaken at scale. Nevertheless, big is not necessarily better: assisting even small groups of refugees - and doing it effectively - can also show that actors and organisations from outside Hungary are committed to solving the problem.

The question of economic aid is also important. Plateau State is well-endowed with natural resources, but these are not used in a systematic way. Plateau State is historically a major producer of tin, but most of the mines are of a small-scale artisanal nature. Such economic activity is, at the moment, officially banned, but is still widespread.²⁰ There are tremendous work safety and environmental issues,²¹ not to mention the government's inability to tax and regulate the mining.

Foreign ODA agencies can have a positive impact by creating an environment where the government is willing to allow mining. International experience shows that foreign agencies can assist miners to improve occupational safety and health and to inflict less environmental damage.²²

In some instances, the agencies can even help the miners to market their products. As noted earlier, Plateau State is home to numerous faith-based organisations with strong local networks, among other advantages. In this context, Hungary Helps' tendency to help Christian communities directly may not be seen by other religious groups as some kind of problematic bias toward Christians and against them. These activities can be seen as part of a bigger picture of assistance, strengthening the whole institutional and societal network of Plateau State, which can, in turn, support non-Christian communities as well.

Educational assistance is also crucial. Hungary is already present in this area, as hundreds of Nigerian christian students receive scholarships for higher education studies in Hungary.²³ Potentially, the Hungary Helps scholarship system can be overhauled as well - for example, by focused recruitment drives in particular geographic regions of Nigeria, such as Plateau State. It remains to be seen what changes, if any, will be made by Hungary's new government to Hungary Helps or Hungary's ODA work in general. It is worth noting in this regard, that the agency has close links with important partners such as the United States State Department and organisations that promote religious freedom. Moreover, the incoming Hungarian government already expressed that it seeks to continue helping Africa,²⁴ and that they seek to "cooperate with countries from where migration pressure is possible",²⁵ and the issue of migration will be generally a "priority"²⁶ so it is clear that to some extent the issue of Sahel international development is included in their plans.

The network and approach of Hungary Helps is unusual and valuable in the context of ODA agencies that are based in Central Europe. Of the four countries in the Visegrád group (V4), Hungary is the only one whose ODA is focusing deliberately on Nigeria. Meanwhile, each of Czechia and Poland has an ODA agency with ample experience in Africa. These agencies, while not expressly faith-based, have worked closely with several faith-based organisations in aid projects. Both of them, however, primarily concentrate on Central and Eastern Africa, namely, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Kenya.²⁷ Hungary Helps' focus on Nigeria, and the importance of the country, means that activities in Plateau State (or other parts of the country) could, in due course, involve other agencies from Central Europe or the countries of the Three Seas Initiative.



*Peter Szijjarto, ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary
(Shutterstock)*

Conclusion: Plateau State as an Opportunity for ODA Agencies

That Hungary Helps has been active in Plateau State - a troubled part of a troubled nation - is, in itself, an important indicator of the agency's effectiveness. The peculiar situation of Plateau State - an area of widespread conflict, yet with its relative ease of access to foreign organisations and well-developed networks through which ODA agencies can work - means that expenditure of time and money can have a greater impact there than in other parts of the Sahel. This matters, given the coming scarcity of resources available to ODA agencies and the general importance of Nigeria.

There are therefore significant opportunities for other ODA agencies - from other V4 countries and further afield - who may want to collaborate with Hungary Helps or its successor in Hungarian ODA in Plateau State. Alternatively, the ODA agencies may want to seek opportunities in other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa where conditions are broadly similar to those of Plateau State, and use them as model regions for their work.

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