Arctic Temperature Rising: And It's Not Just Climate Change

In geopolitical terms, the Arctic has been mostly considered peripheral since the end of the Soviet Union. Since then, three things have changed. First, NATO's commitment of military assets to the region has diminished: priorities have been elsewhere. Nevertheless, this has been at a time when Russia has maintained a strong military presence in the region. Second, China has shown that it, too, sees the Arctic as a key region: military exercises in the Arctic have often been carried out in collaboration with Russia. Third, climate change appears to be having a major impact - not least of which is an improvement to the navigability of the Northern Sea Route. All of this is occurring in the context of an international legal system that complicates the resolution of major disputes in the region.

In the context of the emerging great power competition of the 21st century, this paper shows how the primary competitors to NATO can exploit critical capability gaps in allied Arctic capabilities to generate strategic uncertainty and challenge allied cohesion and decision-making. As the world becomes more globalized, this paper posits that diverse domains are no longer in isolation. Authoritarian actors and competitors with the NATO alliance can utilize capability gaps in one region to make strategic gains in another. This paper considers recent investment by, as well as joint activities between, Russia and China. Environmental changes in the Arctic region provide an opportunity for those countries to severely strain NATO and its allies' capabilities: meanwhile, they can make strategic gains in other domains such as the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, and Central Europe. This paper proposes an imaginary scenario in which rivalry in and around the Arctic between China and Russia on one side and NATO on the other develops to the latter’s disadvantage. The scenario shows that competitors to NATO and its allies’ don’t need to defeat NATO in an all out physical confrontation to either make strategic gains or weaken it. Instead, all they need do is utilize capability gaps to create uncertainty to threaten allied cohesion and decision-making from within. The paper concludes with specific recommendations for NATO to minimize the risk of such a scenario.